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Comment
Arnold Zellner
The authors are to be congratulated for their deep
appreciation of Jeffreys’s famous book, Theory of
Probability, and their very impressive, knowledge-
able consideration of its contents, chapter by chap-
ter. Many will benefit from their analyses of topics
in Jeffreys’s book. As they state in their abstract,
“Our major aim here is to help modern readers in
navigating this difficult text and in concentrating on
passages that are still relevant today.” From what
follows, it might have been more accurate to use
the phrase, “modern well-informed Bayesian statis-
ticians” rather than “modern readers” since the au-
thors’ discussions assume a rather advanced knowl-
edge of modern Bayesian statistics. Readers who are
“just” physicists, chemists, philosophers of science,
economists, etc., may have great difficulty in un-
derstanding the authors’ guide to Jeffreys’s book.
This is unfortunate since the book provides meth-
ods and philosophical principles relevant for all the
sciences. Perhaps in the future, additional reviews
of Jeffreys’s book will be prepared that are under-
standable to a broader range of readers, as was done
in having scientists and scholars from many fields
discuss at length Jeffreys’s and others’ thoughts on
simplicity and complexity at a conference and re-
ported in Zellner, Kuezenkamp and McAleer (2001).
Another point that affects the authors’ discussion
is their apparent misinterpretation of the title of
Jeffreys’s book. They write, “The title itself is mis-
leading in that there is no exposition of the math-
ematical bases of probability theory in the sense of
Billingsley (1986) and Feller (1997).” In this regard,
years ago Lord Rutherford, a famous physical scien-
tist, said that if you need statistics to analyze your
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data, you better redesign your experiment, and as a
result the word “statistics” was not highly regarded
in the physical sciences and the term “probability
theory” was employed by Jeffreys, Jaynes (2003)
and many other physical scientists to include ap-
plied and theoretical statistics, mathematical meth-
ods, including elements of formal probability the-
ory and philosophical aspects of science. With their
narrow interpretation of Jeffreys’s title, the authors
found many discussions in the book to be “irrel-
evant,” whereas Jeffreys considered them to be of
fundamental importance and did not want to have
his book limited to just mathematical topics, as in
his and his wife’s very famous book, Mathematical
Methods of Physics. And indeed, Good [(1980), page
32] wrote, “In summary, Jeffreys’s pioneering work
on neo-Bayesian methods. . . was stimulated by his
interest in philosophy, mathematics, and physics,
and has had a large permanent influence on sta-
tistical logic and techniques. In my review Good
(1962) I said that Jeffreys’s book on probability “is
of greater importance for the philosophy of science,
and obviously of greater immediate practical impor-
tance, than nearly all the books on probability writ-
ten by professional philosophers lumped together.”
I believe this is still true, though more professional
philosophers have woken up.”
With respect to the discussion of Chapter 1, read-
ers will wonder what the authors mean by terms like
“subjective,” “objective,” “objective priors” and “gen-
uine prior information.” Contrary to what the au-
thors state, Jeffreys did adjust his “objective priors”
(1) to get a “reasonable” amount of invariance, (2)
to get “reasonable” results in the Laplace rule of
succession, binomial problem and (3) to correct for
“selection results” in testing many alternative mod-
els with large sets of data. Thus he was not always
an “objective” Bayesian but rather a very thought-
ful Bayesian who recognized needs for better pro-
cedures for certain problems and provided them in
many cases. Perhaps he should be called a “prag-
matic” Bayesian.
Most important in Chapter 1 is Jeffreys’s axiom
system for learning from data and experience that
is applicable to research in all fields of science. He
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considered deduction and induction at great length
in a most interesting productive manner and the au-
thors provide interesting and useful comments. How-
ever, the authors’ introduction of decision theoretic
considerations as a solution in discussion of point 1
fails to recognize that the decision theoretic solution
based on limited data, though “optimal” may not
be very good because of the limited data employed.
Good science requires testing models’ explanatory
and predictive performance using much data in or-
der to ascertain the validity of a particular theory,
say Einstein’s theory and along the way in testing
many variants of the original model will probably
be considered. And finally, one has to specify a loss
or utility function. . . whose loss function? Errors in
formulating loss or utility functions can vitally af-
fect the quality of “optimal” decisions, as is well
known. And to suggest that the debate about model
choice was not present in Jeffreys’s time overlooks
the well-known debates that raged about Newton’s
“laws” versus Einstein’s “laws” and the adequacy of
quantum theory, etc., during the early 20th century
and beyond, about which Jeffreys was fully aware.
Further, the authors’ statement in point 8 about
grounding Theory of Probability within mathemat-
ics fails to note that Jeffreys recognized that there is
controversy about the foundations of mathematics.
Still he pragmatically adopted point 8.
Most important in Chapter 1 are Jeffreys’s com-
ments on his dissatisfaction with the standard proof
of the product rule of probability that is used to
derive Bayes’ theorem that led him to introduce
the product rule of probability as an axiom, rather
than a theorem in his system, as the authors note
in their discussion of the derivation of Bayes’ the-
orem. Jeffreys noted that the assumption that the
elements of the sets A, B and the intersection of
A and B are equally likely to be drawn, all hav-
ing a probability equal to 1/n, where n is the total
number of elements, will not be satisfied in many
cases. After stating that he was unable to prove the
product rule without this assumption, he pragmat-
ically introduced the result as Axiom 7 on page 25.
Since many, including myself, worried about this ba-
sic point, I was happy to discover that the proof of
the product rule could be generalized by going to
a hierarchical model with the probabilities for ele-
ments of the sets assumed to have properties that
produced the usual product rule of probability; see
Zellner (2007). Further, earlier in my concern about
valid proofs or derivations of Bayes’ theorem, I ap-
proached the problem as an engineer might by con-
sidering the informational inputs, namely the infor-
mation in a prior density and in a likelihood func-
tion, and the output information, the information in
a posterior density for the parameters and a marginal
density for the observations. On using Shannon’s
measure of information, it is possible to form an ex-
pression, output information minus input informa-
tion and to minimize it with respect to the choice
of the form of the output or posterior density for
the parameters. The solution is to take the posterior
density equal to the prior density times the likeli-
hood function divided by the marginal density of the
observations, which is precisely the result yielded
by Bayes’ theorem. Also, when this solution is em-
ployed, it is the case that the output information
equals the input information and thus the procedure
is 100% efficient. See Zellner (1988) for the detailed
results and commentary on them by E. T. Jaynes, B.
M. Hill, S. Kullback and J. Bernardo, all reprinted
in Zellner (1997b) along with solutions to variants of
the above problem. For example, in some problems
we may not have an input prior but just an input
likelihood function. Then the solution to the min-
imization problem is to take the posterior density
proportional to likelihood function, a 100% efficient
solution that happens to be exactly the fiducial in-
ference procedure suggested by R. A. Fisher who,
as Jeffreys and others pointed out, did not have a
theoretical justification for it. Also, other optimal in-
formation processing results are presented that take
account of the varying quality of input information,
temporal relations of the inputs from one period to
the output of the next period, etc. In effect, we now
have a number of optimal learning models, not just
one, Bayes’ theorem, to use in learning from data
and experience. Given that Jeffreys was deeply con-
cerned about how to justify Bayes’ theorem and how
to learn effectively from data and experience, I hope
that he likes these results that flowed from his con-
cern about the validity and applicability of proofs of
Bayes’ theorem.
With respect to the authors’ comments on prior
densities, in particular non-informative priors, they
very thoughtfully review Jeffreys’s innovative pro-
cedure for producing non-informative priors with
many critical remarks regarding his use and mis-
use of unbounded measures. As regards a prior for
the binomial parameter p, which can take on values
in the closed interval zero to 1, the authors consider
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Laplace’s uniform prior, Haldane’s prior and the Jef-
freys’s prior followed by a thoughtful discussion of
the famous Laplace Rule of Succession for analysis
of which Jeffreys suggests putting lumps of proba-
bility on the values zero and one and spreading out
the remaining probability mass uniformly, zero to
one in order to get “reasonable” results for Laplace’s
problem: given n independent dichotomous, bino-
mial trials and observing n “successes” in n trials,
what is the probability of a success on the next try?
Jeffreys expressed his view that his non-informative
prior and Haldane’s prior that are symmetric around
a half and go to infinity at p = 0 and p = 1 put
too much mass in the neighborhoods of the extreme
points, 0 and 1, while the Laplace uniform prior
does not put enough mass in the neighborhood of
the extreme points, again very pragmatically sug-
gests a modified Laplace mixed prior density. As I
have pointed out in Zellner [(1997b), page 117], my
“maximal data information prior” (MDIP) for the
binomial parameter p, in the closed interval 0 to 1
is
f(p) = 1.6186xppx(1− p)(1−p)
a density that is symmetric about p= 12 , its minimal
value, and rises to 1.6186 at both p= 0 and p = 1.
It is thus “between” the uniform and Jeffreys’s and
Haldane’s priors that shoot off to infinity at the end
points. Further, a similar result is available for the
multinomial model’s parameters. Also, the criterion
functional that is optimized to produce this MDIP
for the binomial parameter and many others is an
information criterion functional (see Zellner, 1997b,
page 128ff for details) and uses of it to produce
priors for many models and problems that are in
general invariant to linear transformations and can
be made invariant to other relevant transformations
and related to work by Jeffreys, Berger, Bernardo
and others on this difficult problem.
Further, in the case of a prior for a correlation co-
efficient in a normal model, the authors present an
“arc-sine” prior for the correlation coefficient that
is exactly the MDIP for this parameter. Also, the
MDIP approach has been applied to the AR(1) sta-
tionary process, a problem discussed in the current
paper and by Jeffreys. As explained in Zellner [(1997b),
page 138], the MDIP for this problem is p(b, σ) =
c(1−b2)1/2/σ, with−1< b < 1. This contrasts mark-
edly with the Jeffreys prior p(b, σ) = c1/(1− b2)1/2σ
that the authors present without noting that Jef-
freys [(1967), page 359] states, “The [Jeffreys] es-
timate rule gives a singularity at not only b = 1,
which might be tolerable, but also at b=−1, which
is not.” Thus Jeffreys, always honest and pragmatic,
reports that his prior for this problem is intolerable.
See also the MDIP prior for parameters of a station-
ary AR(2) process and many other models in Zellner
(1997a). Given the remarkable properties of MDIPs
and the general principle from which they are de-
rived, it is indeed surprising that the authors make
no mention of them.
In closing, I shall quote the conclusions regard-
ing Jeffreys’s research contributions made by a lead-
ing Bayesian statistician to provide readers with an
alternative appreciation of Jeffreys’s contributions
that can be compared to that presented in the au-
thors’ paper. Seymour Geisser (1980) wrote:
If one were to present a short selected
summary of Jeffreys’s contributions to
Bayesian inference, I believe that the fol-
lowing would be on everybody’s list.
(1) He made the inductive argument a
“logical” one within the context of a Bayes-
ian framework and maintained it could
only be so within this framework.
(2) He made a valiant attempt to quan-
tify lack of knowledge by giving rather
clever canonical rules and conventions but
was not constrained to think only in these
terms.
(3) He produced a normative catalog of
cogently reasoned Bayesian solutions to
many conventional statistical paradigms.
(4) He introduced and developed invari-
ance considerations into the Bayesian sys-
tem.
(5) His devastating critiques of the vari-
ous frequency theories propounded by
Venn, Fisher, Neymann and others were,
in the words of de Finetti (1970), closely
argued and unanswerable.
In summary, Jeffreys’s approach amalga-
mated a Bayesian system with two primi-
tive data principles reflective of public sci-
entific work: (1) letting the data speak
for themselves and (2) the actual units
in which you choose to express your work
should by and large not affect the infer-
ence. This is translated into so-called non-
informative priors and invariance under
suitable transformations. It was a rather
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remarkable conception, brilliantly executed,
whose ultimate test is how it works in
practice (19–20).
Thanks again to the authors for their many in-
sightful comments that are very relevant for apprais-
ing Jeffreys’s technical work and its mathematical
basis. In this connection, some years ago I asked
the famous statistician David Cox why the British
have been so successful in the field of Statistics. He
replied that British statisticians were well trained in
applied mathematics, not theoretical mathematics.
Perhaps this explains Jeffreys’s limited knowledge
of past measure theory and ignorance of recent re-
sults on alternative limiting processes for defining
unbounded measures that have appeared since his
death in 1989.
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